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Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in a multi-
agent setting of knowledge and belief change. It can express in a uniform way epistemic
statements about:
(i) what is true about an initial situation
(ii) what is true about an event occurring in this situation
(iii) what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred.
We axiomatize within the DEL framework what we can infer about (ii) given (i) and (iii)
and what we can infer about (i) given (ii) and (iii). Given three formulas , 0 and 00
describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii), we also show how to build two formulas   00
and 0  00 which capture respectively all the information which can be inferred about (ii)
from  and 00, and all the information which can be inferred about (i) from 0 and 00.
We show how our results extend to other modal logics than K. Finally, we generalize the
classical language of dynamic epistemic logic, where one can reason only with complete
specications of events, in order to account also for incomplete description of events. In the
companion paper (Aucher, 2011), we axiomatize what we can infer about (iii) given (i)
and (ii), and show how to build a formula 
 0 which captures all the information which
can be inferred about (iii) from  and 0.
Keywords: Dynamic epistemic logic, Belief change, Regression, Epistemic planning,
Sequent calculus
1. Introduction
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in a multi-
agent setting of knowledge and belief change, and more generally of information change
(van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, & Kooi, 2007). The core idea of DEL is to split the
task of representing the agents' beliefs into three parts: rst, one represents their beliefs
about an initial situation; second, one represents their beliefs about an event taking
place in this situation; third, one represents the way the agents update their beliefs
about the situation after (or during) the occurrence of the event. Consequently, within
the logical framework of DEL, one can express uniformly epistemic statements about:
(i) what is true about an initial situation,
(ii) what is true about an event occurring in this situation,
(iii) what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred.
From a logical point of view, this trichotomy begs the following three questions. In these
questions, , 0 and 00 are epistemic formulas describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii).
1
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Question 1:
a) Given (i) and (ii), what can we infer about (iii): ; 0 00?
b) How can we build a single formula 
0 which captures all the information
which can be inferred about (iii) from  and 0?
Question 2:
a) Given (i) and (iii), what can we infer about (ii): ; 00 0?
b) How can we build a single formula 00 which captures all the information
which can be inferred about (ii) from  and 00?
Question 3:
a) Given (ii) and (iii), what can we infer about (i): 0; 00 ?
b) How can we build a single formula 000 which captures all the information
which can be inferred about (i) from 0 and 00?
These three inference problems are related to classical problems addressed under dif-
ferent guises in articial intelligence and theoretical computer science, which we call
respectively progression, epistemic planning and regression. We will not repeat here
the conceptual motivations for addressing such questions and how they have been ad-
dressed in other logical formalisms since we already spelled it out in the companion
paper (Aucher, 2011). In this companion paper, we dealt with the rst question. In this
paper, we are going to deal with the second and third question. In two other related pa-
pers (Aucher, Maubert, & Schwarzentruber, 2011, 2012), we provided a tableau method
(implemented in LOTRECscheme) to decide whether an inference of one of the three
kinds above holds and showed that this decision problem is NEXPTIME-complete.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are identical to the rst two sections
of the companion paper (Aucher, 2011) (without the running example and without the
Kit Fine formulas for KP'). We repeat them in order to make the paper self-contained. In
Section 2, we introduce our logical formalism and show how one can naturally express
epistemic statements about (i), (ii) and (iii) within this framework. In Section 3, we
introduce some mathematical objects needed in the subsequent proofs, namely Kit Fine
formulas. Sections 4 and 5 are organized similarly. In both sections, we rst provide
two equivalent sequent calculi which axiomatize the inference relations of Question 2)
a) and of Question 3)a), both for epistemic and ontic events. Then we show how our
results extend to other modal logics than K. Afterwards, we dene constructively and
non-constructively the epistemic planning 00 from  to 00 and the regression 000
of 00 by 0. Finally, in both sections, we provide an example of epistemic planning and
regression. In Section 6, we show how the full BMS language introduced by Baltag,
Moss and Solecki can be generalized to account for incomplete descriptions of events.
In Section 7, we review the related work and we end the paper with some concluding
remarks.
2. Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Following the DEL methodology described above, we split the exposition of our logical
formalism into three subsections. In the rest of the paper, Agt is a nite set of agents
and  is a set of propositional letters called atomic facts. This section is basically the
same as Section 2 of (Aucher, 2011) (without the running example and without Remark
9).
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2.1 Representation of the initial situation: L-model
A (pointed) L-model (M;w) represents how the actual world represented by w is per-
ceived by the agents. Atomic facts are used to state properties of this actual world.
Denition 1 (L-model). A L-model is a tupleM = (W;R; V ) whereW is a non-empty
set of possible worlds, R : Agt! 2WW is a function assigning to each agent j 2 Agt a
relation over W called an accessibility relation, and V :  ! 2W is a function called a
valuation assigning to each propositional letter of  a subset of W .
We write w 2M for w 2W , and (M;w) is called a pointed L-model. If w; v 2W , we
write wRjv for R(j)(w; v) and Rj(w) = fv 2W j wRjvg.
Intuitively, in the denition above, v 2 Rj(w) means that in world w agent j considers
world v as being possibly the world w.
Now, we dene the epistemic language L which can be used to describe and state
properties of L-models. In particular, the formula Bj reads as \agent j Believes ".
Its truth conditions are dened in such a way that Bj holds in a possible world when
 holds in all the worlds agent j considers possible. Dually, the formula hBji reads as
\agent j considers possible that  holds".
Denition 2 (Language L). We dene the language L inductively as follows:
L :  ::= p j : j  ^  j Bj
where p ranges over  and j over Agt. The formula  _  is an abbreviation for
:(: ^ : ), the formula !  an abbreviation for : _  , and the formula hBji an
abbreviation for :Bj:. 1
LetM be a L-model, w 2M and  2 L. The satisfaction relation M;w j=  is dened
inductively as follows:
M;w j= p i w 2 V (p)
M;w j= : i not M;w j= 
M;w j=  ^  i M;w j=  and M;w j=  
M;w j= Bj i for all v 2 Rj(w);M; v j= 
We write M j=  when M;w j=  for all w 2M , and j=  when M j=  for all L-model
M .
Theorem 1 (Soundness and completeness of K). (Blackburn, de Rijke, & Venema,
2001) The logic K is dened by the following axiom schemata and inference rules:
(Propositional) All propositional axiom schemata and inference rules
(Bj-distribution) ` Bj(!  )! (Bj! Bj )
(Bj-necessitation) If `  then ` Bj
A formula  2 L is a K-theorem, written  2 K, when  can be derived by successively
applying (some of) the inference rules on (some of) the axioms.  is K-inconsistent
when : is derivable in K, and K-consistent otherwise. Then, for all  2 L,  2 K
implies that j=  (soundness), and j=  implies that  2 K (completeness).
1The degree deg() of a formula  2 L is dened inductively as follows: deg(p) = 0; deg(:) = deg(); deg(^ ) =
maxfdeg(); deg( )g; deg(Bj) = 1 + deg(). We dene similarly the degree deg(0) of a formula 0 from the
language L0 of Denition 5.
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2.2 Representation of the event: L0-model
The propositional letters p0 describing events are called atomic events and range over an
innite set 0. To each atomic event p0, we assign a formula Pre(p0) of the language L,
which is called the precondition of p0. This precondition corresponds to the property that
should be true at any world w of a L-model so that the atomic event p0 can `physically'
occur in this world w.
Denition 3 (Precondition function). A precondition function Pre : 0 ! L is a
surjective function which assigns to each propositional letter p0 a formula of L.
Note that the denition above constrains indirectly the denition of the innite set
0. Also, note that if precondition functions were bijective, then all the results of this
paper and its companion paper (Aucher, 2011) would still hold.
A pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) represents how the actual event represented by w0 is
perceived by the agents.
Denition 4 (L0-model). A L0-model is a tuple M 0 = (W 0; R0; V 0) where W 0 is a non-
empty set of possible events, R0 : Agt ! 2W 0W 0 is a function assigning to each agent
j 2 Agt a relation overW called an accessibility relation, and V 0 : 0 ! 2W 0 is a function
called a valuation assigning to each propositional letter of 0 a subset of W 0 such that
for all w0 2W 0, there is at most one p0 such that w0 2 V (p0). (Exclusivity)
We write w0 2M 0 for w0 2W 0, and (M 0; w0) is called a pointed L0-model. If w0; v0 2W 0,
we write w0R0jv
0 for R0(j)(w0; v0) and R0j(w
0) = fv0 2W 0 j w0R0jv0g.
Intuitively, v0 2 Rj(w0) means that while the possible event represented by w0 is
occurring, agent j considers possible that the possible event represented by v0 is actually
occurring. The condition (Exclusivity) expresses in our framework the fact that a single
precondition is assigned to each possible event, as in the standard BMS framework of
(Baltag & Moss, 2004). This BMS logical framework will be generalized in Section 6.
Just as we dened a language L for epistemic models, we also dene a language L0
for L0-models whose truth conditions are identical to the ones of the language L. This
language was already introduced in (Baltag, Moss, & Solecki, 1999). In the sequel,
formulas of L0 will always be indexed by the quotation mark ', unlike formulas of L.
Denition 5 (Language L0). We dene the language L0 inductively as follows:
L0 : 0 ::= p0 j :0 j 0 ^ 0 j Bj0
where p0 ranges over 0 and j over Agt. The formula 0 _  0 is an abbreviation for
:(:0 ^ : 0), the formula 0 !  0 is an abbreviation for :0 _  0, and the formula
hBji0 is an abbreviation for :Bj:0.
Let M 0 be a L0-model, w0 2 M 0 and 0 2 L0. The satisfaction relation M 0; w0 j= 0 is
dened inductively as follows:
M 0; w0 j= p0 i w0 2 V 0(p0)
M 0; w0 j= :0 i not M 0; w0 j= 0
M 0; w0 j= 0 ^  0 i M 0; w0 j= 0 and M 0; w0 j=  0
M 0; w0 j= Bj0 i for all v0 2 R0j(w0);M 0; v0 j= 0:
We write M 0 j= 0 when M 0; w0 j= 0 for all w0 2 M 0, and j= 0 when M 0 j= 0 for all
L0-model M 0.
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Now, we introduce the notion of P 0-complete models which will play a technical role
in the axiomatization of our inference relation in the next sections.
Denition 6 (P 0-complete L0-model). Let P 0 be a subset of 0. A P 0-complete L0-model
is a L0-model M 0 such that
for all w0 2M 0, there is a unique p0 2 P 0 such that w0 2 V 0(p0). (P 0-complete)
A complete L0-model is a 0-complete L0-model M 0.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness of K0 and KP'). The logic K0 is dened by
the following axiom schemata and inference rules:
(Propositional) All propositional axiom schemata and inference rules
(Bj-distribution) `0 Bj(0 !  0)! (Bj0 ! Bj 0)
(Bj-necessitation) If `0 0 then `0 Bj0
(Exclusivity) `0 p0 ! :q0 for all p0 6= q0
Let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. The logic KP' is dened by adding to the logic K0 the
following axiom:
(P 0-Complete) `0
_
p02P 0
p0
We say that a formula 0 2 L0 is a K0-theorem, written 0 2 K0, when 0 can be derived
by successively applying (some of) the inference rules on (some of) the axioms of K0. We
say that 0 is K0-inconsistent when :0 is derivable in K0, and K0-consistent otherwise.
Then, for all 0 2 L0, 0 2 K0 implies that j=0 0 (soundness) and j=0 0 implies 0 2 K0
(completeness). Similar denitions and results hold for KP'.
2.3 Update of the initial situation by the event: product update
The precondition function of Denition 3 induces a precondition function for L0-models,
which assigns to each possible event w0 of a L0-model a formula of L. This formula
corresponds to the property that should be true at any world w of a L-model so that
the possible event w0 can `physically' occur in the world w.
Denition 7 (Precondition function of a L0-model). Let M 0 = (W 0; R0; V 0) be a L0-
model. The precondition function of M 0 is the function Pre : W 0 ! L dened as
follows:
Pre(w0) =

Pre(p0) if there is p0 such that M 0; w0 j= p0
> otherwise. (1)
where > is any theorem of K.
We then redene equivalently in our setting the BMS product update of (Batlag, Moss,
& Solecki, 1998). This product update takes as argument a pointed L-model (M;w)
and a pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) representing respectively how an initial situation is
perceived by the agents and how an event occurring in this situation is perceived by
them, and yields a new pointed L-model (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) representing how the new
situation is perceived by the agents after the occurrence of the event.
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Denition 8 (Product update). Let (M;w) = (W;R; V;w) be a pointed L-model and
(M 0; w0) = (W 0; R0; V 0; w0) be a pointed L0-model such that M;w j= Pre(w0). The
product update of (M;w) and (M 0; w0) is the pointed L-model (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) =
(W
; R
; V 
; (w;w0)) dened as follows:
W
 =

(v; v0) 2W W 0
M; v j= Pre(v0) (2)
R
j (v; v
0) =

(u; u0) 2W

 u 2 Rj(v) and u0 2 R0j(v0) (3)
V 
(p) =

(v; v0) 2W

M; v j= p (4)
3. Mathematical Intermezzo
To make this paper self-contained, we briey recall the denitions of Kit Fine's formulas
for the logics K and K0. This section is identical to Section 3 of (Aucher, 2011) (except
that we removed the Kit Fine formulas for KP').
3.1 Kit Fine's formulas for K
A Kit Fine formula n+1 provides a complete syntactic representation of a pointed L-
model up to modal depth n + 1. So, intuitively, if we view a Kit Fine formula n+1 of
Sn+1 as the syntactic representation up to modal depth n + 1 of a possible world w
where it holds, a formula n of S
j
n can also be viewed as a syntactic representation up to
modal depth n of a possible world accessible by Rj from w. This justies our notations
in Equation 7.
Denition 9 (Sets Sn). (Moss, 2007) We dene inductively the sets Sn for n 2 N as
follows:
S0 =
8<: ^
p2S0
p ^
^
p=2S0
:p
 S0  
9=; (5)
Sn+1 =
8<:0 ^ ^
j2Agt
0@ ^
n2Sjn
hBjin ^Bj
0@ _
n2Sjn
n
1A1A 0 2 S0; Sjn  Sn
9=; : (6)
A formula of  2 Sn for some n > 0 will often be written as follows:
 = 0 ^
^
j2Agt
0@ ^
2Rj()
hBji ^Bj
0@ _
2Rj()

1A1A : (7)
The following proposition not only tells us that a formula n completely characterizes
the structure up to modal depth n of any pointed epistemic model where it holds (rst
item), but also that the structure of any epistemic model up to modal depth n can be
characterized by such a formula n (second item). If (M;w) is a pointed L-model, then
n(M;w) will denote the unique element of Sn such that M;w j= n(M;w).
Proposition 1. (Moss, 2007) Let n 2 N and  2 L be such that deg()  n.
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(1) For all n 2 Sn, either n !  2 K or n ! : 2 K.
(2)
_
n2Sn
n 2 K.
The following corollary will play an important role in the sequel. It states that any
formula (of degree n) can be reduced to a disjunction of ns. This explains why these for-
mulas are called normal form formulas. The decomposition of a formula  into s some-
how captures completely and syntactically the relevant structure of the set of pointed
L-models which make  true: each  can be seen as a syntactic description of the modal
structure (up to depth n and modulo bisimulation) of a pointed L-model which makes
 true.
Corollary 1. Let n 2 N and let  2 L be such that deg()  n. Then, there is S  Sn
(possibly empty) such that $
_
2S
 2 K.
3.2 Kit Fine's formulas for K0
In this section, we adapt the denitions and propositions of the previous section for the
logic K0. We also dene the notion of precondition of a Kit Fine formula for K0.
Denition 10 (Sets SP
0
n ). Let P
0 be a nite subset of 0. We dene inductively the
sets SP
0
n for n 2 N as follows:
SP
0
0 = P
0 [
8<: ^
p02P 0
:p0
9=; (8)
SP
0
n+1 =
8<:00 ^ ^
j2Agt
0@ ^
0n2Sjn
hBji0n ^Bj
0@ _
0n2Sjn
0n
1A1A 00 2 SP 00 ; Sjn  SP 0n
9=; : (9)
We dene the precondition of 0, written Pre(0), as follows:
Pre(0) =

Pre(p0) if 00 = p0
> otherwise. (10)
Proposition 2. Let n 2 N and let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Let 0 2 L0 be such that
deg(0)  n and such that the set of propositional letters appearing in 0 is a subset of
P 0.
(1) For all 0n 2 SP
0
n , either 
0
n ! 0 2 K0 or 0n ! :0 2 K0.
(2)
_
0n2SP 0n
0n 2 K0.
Corollary 2. Let n 2 N. Let 0 2 L0 be such that deg(0)  n and let P 0 be the
propositional letters appearing in 0. Then, there is S0  SP 0n (possibly empty) such that
0 $
_
02S0
0 2 K0.
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4. Epistemic planning
In this section, we address Question 2 of the introduction. We start in Section 4.1 by
addressing Question 2)a). We rst deal with epistemic events (Section 4.1.1), then ontic
events (Section 4.1.2), and we eventually generalize our results to other logics than K
(Section 4.1.3). Then, in Section 4.2, we address Question 2)b). Finally, in Section 4.3,
we provide an example of epistemic planning.
4.1 Denition and axiomatization of ; 00
2
0
Denition 11 (Inference relation ; 00
2
0). Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0. The inference
relation ; 00
2
0 is dened as follows:
; 00
2
0 i for all pointed L-models (M; w), and (M00; w00) such that M; w j=
 and M00; w00 j= 00, for all pointed L0-model (M0; w0) such that
M; w j= Pre(w0) and (M; w)
 (M0; w0) is bisimilar to (M00; w00), it
holds that M0; w0 j= 0
The following proposition states that ; 0 00 dened in (Aucher, 2011) and
; 00
2
0 are in fact interdenable. This also shows that the somehow complex denition
of ; 00
2
0 can be simplied into a more compact denition.
Proposition 3. Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0.
; 00
2
0 i ;:0 :00
; 00
2
0 i for all pointed L-model (M;w); and L0-model (M 0; w0) such that
M;w j= Pre(w0), if M;w j=  and (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 then
M 0; w0 j= 0
Proof. The DEL-sequent ; 00
2
0 does not hold
i there are two pointed L-models (M;w) and (M 00; w00) such that M;w j=  and
M 00; w00 j= 00 and there is a pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M;w j= Pre(w0)
and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) is bisimilar to (M 00; w00) and M 0; w0 j= :0
i there are two pointed L-models (M;w) and (M 00; w00) and there is a pointed L0-model
(M 0; w0) such that M;w j= Pre(w0), M;w j= , M 00; w00 j= 00, M 0; w0 j= :0 and
(M;w)
 (M 0; w0) is bisimilar to (M 00; w00).
i there is a pointed L-model and a pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M;w j=
Pre(w0), M;w j= , (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 and M 0; w0 j= :0.
i ;:0 :00 does not hold.
4.1.1 The case of epistemic events
We provide two equivalent sequent calculi which axiomatize the inference relation
; 00
2
0. As explained in detail in the proof of Theorem 3, Proposition 3 allows us
to easily transfer the results obtained for Question 1)a) in (Aucher, 2011) to answer
Question 2)a).
Denition 12 (DEL-Sequent Calculus SC2). The DEL-Sequent Calculus SC2 is dened
by the following axiom schemata and inference rules. Below, ? (resp. >) stands for
any K-inconsistent formula (resp. K-theorem), and ?0 (resp. >0) stands for any K0-
inconsistent formula (resp. K0-theorem).
8
February 3, 2013 Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics JANCL2012-Camera-Ready
?; 00 2 0 A1 ; 00 2 >0 A2 ;? 2 0 A3
p;:p 2 ?0 A4 :p; p 2 ?0 A5 :Pre(p0);> 2 :p0 A6
;:00 2 0 ; 00 ^  00 2 0
;  00 2 0
R1
 ^  ; 00 2 0 : ; 00 2 0
; 00 2 0
R2
; 00 2  0 ; 00 2  0 ! 0
; 00 2 0
R3
; 00 2 0
Bj; hBji00 2 hBji0
R4
; 00 2 0
hBji( ^ Pre(p0)); Bj00 2 Bj(p0 ! 0)
R5
Denition 13 (DEL-Sequent Calculus SC2*). The DEL-Sequent Calculus SC2* is de-
ned by the following axiom schemata and inference rules, together with the axiom
schemata A2 and A6 and inference rules R4 and R5 of the DEL-Sequent Calculus SC
2.
Below, p stands for any propositional formula.
p;:p 2* ?0 A7
; 00 2* 0 ;  00 2* 0
; 00 _  00 2* 0
R6
; 00 2* 0 ; 00 2*  0
; 00 2* 0 ^  0
R7
; 00 2* 0  ; 00 2* 0
 _  ; 00 2* 0
R8
; 00 2* 0
 ; 00 2* 0
R9
; 00 2* 0
; 00 2*  0
R10
where  ! ;  00 ! 00 2 K where 0 !  0 2 K0:
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness of SC2 and SC2*). Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0.
It holds that ; 00
2
0 if and only if ; 00 2 0. It also holds that ; 00
2
0 if and only
if ; 00 2* 0.
Proof. One proves by induction on the number n of inference rules used in a derivation
that for all ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0, it holds that ; 00 2 0 if and only if ;:0 :00
(resp. ; 00 2* 0 if and only if ; 00  0). The base case n = 0 holds because the
axioms of SC2 (resp. SC2*) are dened this way. The induction step also holds because
the rules of SC2 (resp. SC2*) are also all dened according to this logical relationship.
Therefore, it holds that ; 00 2 0
i ;:0 :00,
i ;:0 :00 by soundness and completeness of the DEL-sequent calculus SC of
(Aucher, 2011),
9
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i ; 0
2
00 by Proposition 3.
The same reasoning applies to ; 00 2* 0.
Theorem 4. (Aucher et al., 2011, 2012) Given some formulas ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0,
the problem of determining whether ; 00
2
0 holds is decidable and NEXPTIME-
complete.
4.1.2 The case of ontic events
Just as in the companion paper (Aucher, 2011), to deal with ontic events, we associate
to each propositional variable p0 2 0 a substitution function Sub(p0) :  ! L. Intu-
itively, Sub(p0)(p) is a sucient and necessary condition before the occurrence of p0 for
p to be true after the occurrence of p0. This substitution function induces a substitution
function Sub(M 0; w0) over pointed L0-models (M 0; w0):
Sub(M 0; w0)(p) =

Sub(p0)(p) if M 0; w0 j= p0 for some p0 2 0
p otherwise.
(11)
Then, the new valuation of Equation 4 in Denition 8 is dened as follows:
V 
(p) =
 
v; v0
 2W
 M; v j= Sub(M 0; v0)(p) : (12)
One can easily show that this new denition of the product update is axiomatized by
replacing axiom schemata A4 and A5 by the following axiom schemata:
A
0
4 Sub(p
0)(p);:p 2 :p0
A
0
5 :Sub(p0)(p); p 2 :p0
4.1.3 Extension to other logics
Just as in (Aucher, 2011), all the results of this section can be extended to other
logics than K and K0 in case the class of frames these logics dene is stable for the
product update.
Let C be a class of L-models and C0 be a class of L0-models. C is stable for the product
update with respect to the class C0 when for all M 2 C and all M 0 2 C0, for all w 2 M
and all w0 2 M 0 such that M;w j= Pre(w0), (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) is a pointed L-model of
C.1
Let C be a class of L-models and let C0 be a class of L0-models. The inference relation
; 00 C;C0
2
0 is dened as follows:
; 00 C;C0
2
0 i for all pointed L-model (M;w) of C, and L0-model (M 0; w0) of C0
such that M;w j= Pre(w0), if M;w j=  and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j=
00 then M 0; w0 j= 0.
Let L be a logic for the language L containing K, and let L0 be a logic for the language
L0 containing K0. The DEL-sequent calculus SC2L;L0 is dened as the DEL-sequent calculus
SC2, except that the logic K and K0 are replaced by the logic L and L0 respectively.
Theorem 5. Let L be a logic sound and complete for L with respect to a class C of
L-models and let L0 be a logic sound and complete for L0 with respect to a class C0 of
1As noted in (van Benthem, 2007), the only rst-order frame conditions that are stable for the product update
are those denable as universal Horn sentences. Reexivity, symmetry, and transitivity are of this special form.
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L0-models. If C is stable for the product update with respect to the class C0, then for all
; 00 2 L and all 0 2 L0, it holds that ; 00 C;C0
2
0 if and only if ; 00
L;L0
2
0.
4.2 Epistemic planning from (M;w) to 00 and epistemic planning from 
to 00
Just as for the axiomatization of ; 0 00, the axiomatization of ; 00 2 0 provides
us with a means to compute all the necessary properties 0 that an event should fulll
so that its occurrence in any situation where  holds yields a situation where 00 holds.
However, we could wonder if there is a more compact way to represent all these properties
0. This is what we will show in this section by introducing the notion of epistemic
planning from  to 00: P 0 00.
We build the epistemic planning operator P 0 00 step by step. We start by dening
an epistemic planning operator (M;w)P 0 00 between a pointed L-model and a formula
00 2 L. Then, we extrapolate this denition and dene the epistemic planning operator
 P 0 00 between a Kit Fine formula  and a formula 00 2 L, the formula  somehow
representing a pointed L-model (M;w). Finally, we build on this denition to dene the
full operator  P 0 00, relying on the fact that any formula  2 L can be equivalently
decomposed into a disjunction of Kit Fine formulas s.
4.2.1 Epistemic planning from (M;w) to 00
Denition 14 (Epistemic planning from (M;w) to ). Let (M;w) be a pointed L-
model, let 00 2 L and let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. The epistemic planning from
(M;w) to 00, which we write (M;w)P 0 00, is the formula of L0 dened inductively as
follows:
(M;w)P 0 p =  q0w if M;w j= p? otherwise
(M;w)P 0 (00 ^  00) = ((M;w)P 0 00) ^ ((M;w)P 0  00)
(M;w)P 0 :00 = q0w ^ :((M;w)P 0 00)
(M;w)P 0 Bj00 = q0w ^ ^
v2Rj(w)
Bj
 
q0v ! (M;v)P 0 00 :
(13)
where q0w =
_
p0 2 P 0
M;w j= Pre(p0).
Note that the above denition can easily be turned into an algorithm taking as in-
put an L-model (M;w) and an epistemic goal 00, and yielding as output the formula
(M;w)P 0 00. Theorem 6 below provides an alternative and non-constructive denition
of (M;w)P 0 00.
Theorem 6. Let (M;w) be a pointed L-model, let  2 L and let P 0 be a nite subset
of 0. Then, for any P 0-complete L0-model (M 0; w0), it holds that
M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 00 i M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 (14)
Denition 14 of (M;w) P 0 00 in Theorem 6 entails that, given an initial situation
(M;w), the occurence of any event satisfying the formula (M;w)P 0 00 will result in a
nal situation where 00 holds. This condition (M;w) P 0 00 is not only sucient but
also necessary: any event which does not satisfy the formula (M;w)P 0 00 will not lead
us to a nal situation where 00 holds.
Proof. We prove Theorem 6 by induction on 00.
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 Case 00 = p:
We rst prove the implication from left to right. Assume that M 0; w0 j=
(M;w) P 0 p. Necessarily, M;w j= p, because otherwise we would have that
M 0; w0 j= ?. Hence, M 0; w0 j= q0w, i.e. there is p0 2 P 0 such that M;w j= Pre(p0)
and M 0; w0 j= p0. Therefore, M;w j= Pre(w0). Moreover, by denition of the prod-
uct update (Equation 4), it holds that (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= p.
Now, we prove the implication from right to left. Assume that M;w j= Pre(w0)
and (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= p. Then, by denition of the product update (Equa-
tion 4), it holds that M;w j= p. Now, because (M 0; w0) is P 0-complete, there
is p0 2 P 0 such that M 0; w0 j= p0. Then, Pre(p0) = Pre(w0) and because
M;w j= Pre(w0), it holds that M;w j= Pre(p0). Hence, M 0; w0 j= q0w because
q0w =
W
p0 2 P 0 M;w j= Pre(p0)	. That is, M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 p.
 Case 00 = : 00:
First, we prove the implication from left to right. Assume that M 0; w0 j=
(M;w)P 0 : 00. Then, M 0; w0 j= q0w ^: ((M;w)P 0  00). Then, because M 0; w0 j=
q0w, there is p0 2 P 0 such that M 0; w0 j= p0 and M;w j= Pre(p0). That is,
M;w j= Pre(w0). Moreover, because M 0; w0 2 (M;w) P 0  00, by Induction Hy-
pothesis, it holds that either M;w 2 Pre(w0) or (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) 2  00. However,
because we just proved thatM;w j= Pre(w0), it holds that (M;w)
(M 0; w0) 2  00.
That is, (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00.
Now, we prove the second implication from right to left. Assume that M;w j=
Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00. Then, (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) 2  00. Therefore, by
Induction Hypothesis, M 0; w0 2 (M;w) P 0  00, i.e. M 0; w0 j= : ((M;w)P 0  00).
Moreover, because (M 0; w0) is P 0-complete, there is p0 2 P 0 such that M 0; w0 j= p0.
Besides, M;w j= Pre(p0), because Pre(p0) = Pre(w0). Therefore, M 0; w0 j=W
p0 2 P 0 M;w j= Pre(p0)	, i.e. M 0; w0 j= Wp0 2 P 0 M;w j= Pre(p0)	, i.e.
M 0; w0 j= q0w. Hence, M 0; w0 j= q0w ^ : ((M;w)P 0  00), i.e. M 0; w0 j= (M;w) P 0
: 00. That is, M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 00.
 Case 00 = 001 ^ 002:
We only prove the implication from left to right, the other direction of the
implication is proved similarly. Assume that M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 001 ^ 002. Then,
M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0001^(M;w)P 0002 by Denition 14. So,M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0001
andM 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0002. Then, by Induction Hypothesis,M;w j= Pre(w0) and
(M;w)
(M 0; w0) j= 001 and (M;w)
(M 0; w0) j= 002. So, (M;w)
(M 0; w0) j= 001^002
and M;w j= Pre(w0).
 Case 00 = Bj 00:
First, we prove the implication from left to right. Assume that M 0; w0 j=
(M;w) P 0 Bj 00, i.e. M 0; w0 j= q0w ^ V
v2Rj(w)
Bj (q
0
v ! (M;v)P 0  00). Because
M 0; w0 j= q0w, there is p0 2 P 0 such that M;w j= Pre(p0) and M 0; w0 j= p0.
Therefore, M;w j= Pre(w0). Now, let v 2 Rj(w) and v0 2 Rj(w0) such that
M; v j= Pre(v0). Then, because M 0 is P 0-complete, there is p0 2 P 0 such that
M 0; v0 j= p0. Therefore, Pre(v0) = Pre(p0) and M 0; v0 j= q0v. Now, because
M 0; w0 j= Bj (q0v ! (M; v)P 0  00) for all v 2 Rj(w), it holds that M 0; w0 j=
q0v ! (M;w) P 0  00. Hence, M 0; v0 j= (M 0; v0) P 0  00. Then, by Induction Hy-
pothesis, (M; v) 
 (M 0; v0) j=  00, and so for all (v; v0) 2 Rj(w;w0). Therefore,
(M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= Bj 00, i.e. (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00.
Second, we prove the implication from right to left. Assume that M;w j=
Pre(w0) and (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= Bj 00. Because M 0 is P 0-complete, there is
p0 2 P 0 such thatM 0; w0 j= p0. Therefore,M 0; w0 j= q0w, because Pre(p0) = Pre(w0).
Now, let v 2 Rj(w) and let v0 2 Rj(w0). We are going to prove that M 0; v0 j= q0v !
(M; v)P 0 00. Assume thatM 0; v0 j= q0v. Then, there is p0 2 P 0 such thatM 0; v0 j= p0
12
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and M; v j= Pre(p0). Then, M; v j= Pre(v0) (1) because Pre(v0) = Pre(p0).
Moreover, (M; v) 
 (M 0; v0) j=  00 (2) because (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= Bj 00, be-
cause of (1) and (2). Therefore, M 0; v0 j= q0v ! (M; v) P 0  00, and so for all
v0 2 Rj(w0) and v 2 Rj(w). So, nally, M 0; w0 j=
V
v2Rj(w)
Bj (q
0
v ! (M; v)P 0  00).
Hence, M 0; w0 j= (M;w) P 0 Bj 00, because we already proved that M 0; w0 j= q0w.
That is, M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 00.
4.2.2 Epistemic planning from  to 00
We can generalize the notion of epistemic planning from (M;w) to 00 by considering
that the initial situation is incompletely described by a formula . This leads us to
dene the notion of epistemic planning from  to 00.
Denition 15 (Epistemic planning from  to 00). Let ; 00 2 L and let P 0 be a nite
subset of 0. Let n = maxfdeg(); deg(00)g and N = maxdeg(Pre(p0))  p0 2 P 0	.
Then, by Corollary 1, there is S  Sn+N such that  $
W
2S
 2 K. The epistemic
planning from  to 00, which we write P 0 00, is the formula of L0 dened as follows:
P 0 00 =_ P 0 00   2 S (15)
where, for all  2 Sk+N with k  n and all 00 2 L, the formula  P 0 00 is dened
inductively as follows:
 P 0 p =  q0 if  ! p 2 K? otherwise.
 P 0 (00 ^  00) = ( P 0 00) ^ ( P 0  00)
 P 0 :00 = q0 ^ :( P 0 00)
 P 0 Bj00 = q0 ^ ^
j2Rj()
Bj

q0j ! j P 0 00 :
(16)
where q0 =
_
p0 2 P 0
  ! Pre(p0) 2 K.
The following theorem provides an alternative and non-constructive denition of the
formula P 0 00 of L0.
Theorem 7. Let ; 00 2 L and let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Then, for all P 0-complete
L0-model (M 0; w0), it holds that
M 0; w0 j= P 0 00 i there is (M;w) such that M;w j= ;M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00
Note that we could dene a dual operator of P 0 00 as follows:
[]P 000 , :  P 0 :00 (17)
The counterpart of Theorem 7 for this dual operator is as follows:
M 0; w0 j= []P 000 i for all (M;w) such that M;w j= ;if M;w j= Pre(w0) then (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 (18)
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This denition entails that, given any initial situation satisfying , any event satisfying
[]P 000 occurring in this initial situation will result in a new situation where 00 holds:
; []P 000 KP' 00 (19)
To prove Theorem 7, we rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let 00 2 L and let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Let N =
max

deg(Pre(p0))
 p0 2 P 0	 and n = deg(00). Then, for all pointed L-model (M;w),
for all  2 Sn+N such that M;w j= , it holds that (M;w)P 0 00 $  P 0 00 2 KP'.
Proof. We prove Lemma 1 by induction on the number of symbols in 00, that is j00j.
Our induction hypothesis is P(k): \for all 00 2 L such that j00j = k, for all  2 Sn+N
(where n = deg(00)), and for all pointed L-model (M;w) such that M;w j= , it holds
that (M;w)P 0 00 $  P 0 00 2 KP'".
 Case 00 = p:
If M;w j= p, then  ! p 2 K and (M;w) P 0 p = q0w = _p0 2 P 0  M;w j=
Pre(p0)
	
=
_
p0 2 P 0
  ! Pre(p0) 2 K becauseM;w j= . So, (M;w)P 0 p =
q0 =  P 0 p. If M;w 2 p, then  ! p =2 K, and (M;w)P 0 p = ? =  P 0 p.
So, in both cases, (M;w)P 0 p$  P 0 p 2 KP'.
 Case 00 = 001 ^ 002:
(M;w) P 0 (001 ^ 002) = ((M;w) P 0 001) ^ ((M;w) P 0 002) by denition. So,
(M;w) P 0 (001 ^ 002) = ( P 0 001) ^ ( P 0 002) by Induction Hypothesis. Then,
(M;w)P 0 (001^002) = P 0 (001^002) by denition So, (M;w)P 0 00 $ P 0 00 2
KP'.
 Case 00 = : 00:
(M;w) P 0 : 00 = q0w ^ :((M;w) P 0  00) = q0 ^ :((M;w) P 0  00) because
q0w =
_
p0 2 P 0
M;w j= Pre(p0) = _p0 2 P 0   ! Pre(p0) 2 K because
M;w j= , and for all p0 2 P 0 deg(Pre(p0))  deg(). Therefore, q0w = q0. So,
(M;w) P 0 : 00 $ q0 ^ :( P 0  00) 2 KP' by Induction Hypothesis. That is,
(M;w)P 0 00 $  P 0 00 2 KP'.
 Case 00 = Bj 00:
(M;w)P 0 Bj 00 = q0w ^ V
v2Rj(w)
Bj (q
0
v ! (M; v)P 0  00) = q0 ^ V
v2Rj(w)
Bj
 
q0v !
(M; v) P 0  00. Now, for all v 2 Rj(v), there is j 2 Rj() such that M;v j= j ,
because M;w j= . Moreover, q0v = q0j . Then, by Induction Hypothesis,^
v2Rj(w)
Bj
 
q0v ! (M;v)P 0  00$ ^
j2Rj()
Bj

q0j ! j P 0  00 2 KP':
So, (M;w) P 0 Bj 00 $ q0 ^ ^
j2Rj()
Bj

q0j ! j P 0  00 2 KP', i.e. (M;w) P 0
Bj 
00 $  P 0 Bj 00 2 KP', i.e. (M;w)P 0 00 $  P 0 00 2 KP'.
Proof of Theorem 7. It holds that M 0; w0 j= P 0 00
i M 0; w0 j=
_
 P 0 00   2 Sn+N and  !  2 K,
i M 0; w0 j=  P 0 00 for some  2 Sn+N such that  !  2 K,
14
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i M 0; w0 j= (M;w) P 0 00 for some pointed L-model (M;w) such that M;w j= , for
some  2 Sn+N such that  !  2 K, by Lemma 1,
i M 0; w0 j= (M;w) 00 for some pointed L-model (M;w) such that M;w j= ,
i there is a pointed L-model (M;w) such thatM;w j= ,M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)

(M 0; w0) j= 00 by Theorem 6.
4.2.3 Connection between DEL-sequents ; 00 2 0 and epistemic planning P 0 00
Finally, the following central theorem connects DEL-sequents with the notion of epis-
temic planning.
Theorem 8. Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0. Let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Then,
; 00
KP'
2
0 i P 0 00 ! 0 2 KP' (20)
Just as for the case of progression, Theorem 8 shows that the notion of epistemic
planning from  to 00 is an analogue in a dynamic setting of the notion of prime
implicate in propositional logic. Indeed, Theorem 8 states that P 0 00 captures all the
information which can be inferred about the event that occurred, when everything we
know about the initial situation is that it satises , and everything we know about the
nal situation is that it saties 00. The counterpart of Theorem 8 for the dual operator
[]P 000 states the following:
; 0
KP'
00 i 0 ! []P 000 2 KP': (21)
To prove Theorem 8, we rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let ; 00 2 L, let 0 2 L0 and let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Then, P 000 !
0 2 KP' if and only if for all pointed L-model (M;w) such that M;w j= , it holds that
(M;w)P 0 00 ! 0 2 KP'.
Proof. Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0. Let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Let n = deg(00) and
N = maxfdeg(Pre(p0))  p0 2 P 0g. Then,
P 0 00 ! 0 2 KP'
i
_
 P 0 00   2 Sn+N ;  !  2 K! 0 2 KP' by denition of P 0 00
i for all  2 Sn+N such that  !  2 K, it holds that  P 0 00 ! 0 2 KP'
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) such that M;w j= , it holds that (M;w) P 0 00 !
0 2 KP' by Proposition 2.
Now, we prove Theorem 8:
Proof of Theorem 8. It holds that ; 00
KP'
2
0
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) and L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M;w j= Pre(w0), if
M;w j=  and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00, then M 0; w0 j= 0,
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) such thatM;w j= , for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0),
if M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00, then M 0; w0 j= 0,
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) such thatM;w j= , for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0),
if M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 00, then M 0; w0 j= 0,
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) such thatM;w j= , for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0),
M 0; w0 j= (M;w)P 0 00 ! 0,
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) such that M;w j= , (M;w)P 0 00 ! 0 2 KP',
i P 0 00 ! 0 2 KP' by Lemma 2.
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Figure 1. Cards Example
Finally, note that Theorems 6, 7 and 8 can easily be generalized similarly to other
logics than K and KP' in case the class of frames these logics dene is stable for the
product update.
4.3 Example
We take over the Card Example of (Aucher, 2011), that we recall here. Assume that
agents A, B and C play a card game with three cards: a white one, a red one and a blue
one. Each of them has a single card but they do not know the cards of the other players.
At each step of the game, some of the players show their/her/his card to another player
or to both other players, either privately or publicly. We want to study and represent the
dynamics of the agents' beliefs in this game. The initial situation is represented by the
pointed L-model (M;w) of Figure 1. In this example,  = frj ; bj ; wj j j 2 fA;B;Cgg
where rj stands for `agent j has the red card', bj stands for `agent j has the blue card'
and wj stands for `agent j has the white card'. The boxed possible world corresponds
to the actual world. The propositional letters not mentioned in the possible worlds do
not hold in these possible worlds. The accessibility relations are represented by arrows
indexed by agents between possible worlds. Reexive arrows are omitted in the gure,
which means that for all worlds v 2M and all agents j 2 fA;B;Cg, v 2 Rj(v).
In the situation depicted in this L-model, agent B does not know that agent A has
the red card and does not know that agent C has the blue card: M;w j= (hBBirA ^
hBBi:rA) ^ (hBBibC ^ hBBi:bC). Our problem is therefore the following:
What sucient and necessary property (i.e. `minimal' property) an event should
fulll so that its occurence in the initial situation (M;w) results in a situation
where agent B knows the true state of the world, i.e. agent B knows that agent A
has the red card and that agent C has the blue card?
The answer to this question obviously depends on the kind of atomic events we consider.
In this example, the events P 0 = fp0; q0; r0g under consideration are the following. First,
agent C shows her blue card (p0), second, agent A shows her red card (q0), and third,
agent B herself shows her white card (r0). Therefore, the preconditions of these atomic
events are the following: Pre(p0) = bC , Pre(q0) = rA and Pre(r0) = wB. Answering this
question amounts to compute the formula (M;w)P 0 BB (rA ^ bC ^ wB):
(M;w)P 0 BB (rA ^ bC ^ wB) = q0w ^BB (q0w ! (M;w)P 0 rA)^
BB (q
0
v ! (M; v)P 0 rA)
= q0w ^BB (q0w ! q0w) ^BB (q0v ! ?)
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This last formula can be simplied. Indeed, 
q0w ^BB
 
q0w ! q0w
 ^BB  q0v ! ?$  q0w ^BB:q0v 2 KP'; 
q0w ^BB:q0v
$   p0 _ q0 _ r0 ^BB:r0 2 KP';  
p0 _ q0 _ r0 ^BB:r0$ BB  p0 _ q0 2 KP':
So, nally,
(M;w)P 0 BB (rA ^ bC ^ wB)$ BB(p0 _ q0) 2 KP':
In other words, this result states that agent B should believe either that agent A
shows her red card or that agent C shows her blue card in order to know the true state
of the world. Indeed, since there are only three dierent cards which are known by the
agents and agent B already knows her card, if she learns the card of (at least) one of
the other agents, she will also be able to infer the card of the third agent.
5. Regression
In this section, we address Question 3 of the introduction. We start in Section 5.1 by
addressing Question 3)a). We rst deal with epistemic events (Section 5.1.1), then ontic
events (Section 5.1.2), and we eventually generalize our results to other logics than K
(Section 5.1.3). Then, in Section 5.2, we address Question 3)b). Finally, in Section 5.3,
we provide an example of regression.
5.1 Denition and axiomatization of 0; 00
3

Denition 16 (Inference relation 0; 00
3
). Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0. The inference
relation 0; 00
3
 is dened as follows:
0; 00
3
 i for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0), and L-model (M 00; w00) such that
M 0; w0 j= 0 and M 00; w00 j= 00, for all pointed L-model (M;w) such
thatM;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
(M 0; w0) is bisimilar to (M 00; w00),
it holds that M;w j= 
Just as for ; 00
2
0, the following proposition states that ; 0 00 and 0; 00
3

are in fact interdenable. Besides, this proposition also shows that the somehow complex
denition of 0; 00
3
 can be simplied into a more compact denition.
Proposition 4. Let ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0.
0; 00
3
 i :; 0 :00
0; 00
3
 i for all pointed L-model (M;w), and L0-model (M 0; w0) such that
M;w j= Pre(w0), if M 0; w0 j= 0 and (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 then
M;w j= 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
5.1.1 The case of epistemic events
We provide two equivalent sequent calculi which axiomatize the inference relation
0; 00
3
. As explained in the proof of Theorem 9, Proposition 3 allows us to easily
transfer the results obtained for Question 1)a) in (Aucher, 2011) to answer Question
3)a).
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Denition 17 (DEL-Sequent Calculus SC3). The DEL-Sequent Calculus SC3 is dened
by the following axiom schemata and inference rules. Below, ? (resp. >) stands for
any K-inconsistent formula (resp. K-theorem), and ?0 (resp. >0) stands for any K0-
inconsistent formula (resp. K0-theorem).
0; 00 3 > A1 ?0; 00 3  A2 0;? 3  A3
>0; p 3 p A4 >0;:p 3 :p A5 p0;> 3 Pre(p0) A6
0;:00 3  0; 00 ^  00 3 
0;  00 3 
R1
0; 00 3  !  0; 00 3  
0; 00 3 
R2
0 ^  0; 00 3  : 0; 00 3 
0; 00 3 
R3
0; 00 3 
Bj
0; hBji00 3 hBji
R4
0; 00 3 
hBji(0 ^ p0); Bj00 3 Bj(Pre(p0)! )
R5
Denition 18 (DEL-Sequent Calculus SC3*). The DEL-Sequent Calculus SC3* is de-
ned by the following axiom schemata and inference rules, together with the axiom
schemata A2 and A6 and inference rules R4 and R5 of the DEL-Sequent Calculus SC
3.
Below, p stands for any propositional formula.
>0; p 3* p A7
0; 00 3*  0;  00 3* 
0; 00 _  00 3* 
R6
0; 00 3*   0; 00 3* 
0 _  0; 00 3* 
R7
0; 00 3*  0; 00 3*  
0; 00 3*  ^  
R8
0; 00 3* 
0;  00 3*  
R9
0; 00 3* 
 0; 00 3* 
R10
where !  ; 00 ! 00 2 K where  0 ! 0 2 K0:
Theorem 9 (Soundness and completeness of SC3 and SC3*). Let ; 00 2 L and
0 2 L0. It holds that 0; 00 3  if and only if 0; 00 3 . It also holds that
0; 00
3
 if and only if 0; 00 3* .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3. It follows from Proposition 4 and
the soundness and completeness of the DEL-Sequent calculus SC of (Aucher, 2011).
Theorem 10. (Aucher et al., 2011, 2012) Given some formulas ; 00 2 L and 0 2 L0,
the problem of determining whether 0; 00
3
 holds is decidable and NEXPTIME-
complete.
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5.1.2 The case of ontic events
Proposition 4 allows us to easily transfer previous results to the case of ontic events
as well, like for the case of ; 00
2
0. If in the denition of the product update, the
denition of the new valuation given by Equation 4 is replaced by Equation 12, then
the inference relation ; 00
2
0 in the case of ontic events is axiomatized by the same
sequent calculus SC3* except that the axiom schemas A4 and A5 are replaced by the
following two Axiom schemas:
A04 p0; p
3
Sub(p0)(p)
A05 p0;:p 3 :Sub(p0)(p)
5.1.3 Extension to other logics
Just as in Section 4, all the results of this section can be extended to other logics than
K and K0 in case the class of frames dened by these logics is stable for the product
update.
Let C be a class of L-models and let C0 be a class of L0-models. The inference relation
00; 0 C;C0
3
 is dened as follows:
0; 00 C;C0
3
 i for all pointed L-model (M;w) of C, and L0-model (M 0; w0) of C0
such thatM;w j= Pre(w0), ifM 0; w0 j= 0 and (M;w)
(M 0; w0) j=
00 then M;w j= .
Let L be a logic. The DEL-sequent calculus SC3L;L0 is dened as the DEL-sequent cal-
culus SC3, except that the logic K and K0 are replaced by the logic L and L0 respectively.
Theorem 11. Let L be a logic sound and complete for L with respect to a class C of
L-models and let L0 be a logic sound and complete for L0 with respect to a class C0 of
L0-models. If C is stable for the product update with respect to C0, then for all ; 00 2 L
and all 0 2 L0, it holds that 0; 00 C;C0
3
 if and only if 0; 00
L;L0
3
.
5.2 Regression of 00 by (M 0; w0) and regression of 00 by 0
Just as for the axiomatizations of ; 0 00 and ; 00 2 0, the axiomatization of
0; 00 3  provides us with a means to compute all the necessary properties  that held
intially, once an event satisfying 0 has occurred and has resulted in a situation where
00 holds. However, we could wonder if there is a more compact way to represent all
these properties . This is what we will show in this section by introducing the notion
of regression of 00 by 0: 0  00.
We build the regression operator 000 step by step. We start by dening a regression
operator (M 0; w0)00 between a pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) and a formula 00 2 L. Then,
we extrapolate this denition and dene the epistemic planning operator 000 between
a Kit Fine formula 0 and a formula 00 2 L, the formula 0 somehow representing a
pointed L0-model (M 0; w0). Finally, we extend this denition to dene the full operator
0  00, relying on the fact that any formula 0 2 L0 can be decomposed equivalently
into a disjunction of Kit Fine formulas 0s.
5.2.1 Regression of 00 by (M 0; w0)
Denition 19 (Regression of 00 by (M 0; w0)). Let (M 0; w0) be a pointed L0-model and
let 00 2 L. The regression of 00 by (M 0; w0), which we write (M 0; w0)00, is the formula
of L dened as follows:
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(M 0; w0) p = Pre(w0) ^ p
(M 0; w0) (00 _  00) = ((M 0; w0) 00) _ ((M 0; w0)  00)
(M 0; w0) :00 = Pre(w0) ^ :((M 0; w0) 00)
(M 0; w0) hBji00 = Pre(w0) ^ _
v02Rj(w0)
hBji((M 0; v0) 00): (22)
Readers familiar with the BMS formalism (Baltag & Moss, 2004) might have recog-
nized in Equations 22 the usual reduction axioms. Indeed, if (M 0; w0) is replaced by
hM 0; w0i, we get these reduction axioms back:
hM 0; w0ip $ Pre(w0) ^ p
hM 0; w0i(00 _  00) $ hM 0; w0i00 _ hM 0; w0i 00
hM 0; w0i:00 $ Pre(w0) ^ :hM 0; w0i00
hM 0; w0ihBji00 $ Pre(w0) ^
_
v02Rj(w0)
hBjihM 0; v0i00:
(23)
Theorem 12 below is therefore not surprising, since it corresponds to the truth condi-
tions of the operator hM 0; w0i of the BMS language. This theorem provides an alter-
native and non-constructive denition of (M 0; w0) 00.
Theorem 12. Let (M 0; w0) be a pointed L0-models and let 00 2 L. Then, for all pointed
L-model (M;w), it holds that
M;w j= (M 0; w0) 00 i M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 (24)
Denition 24 of Theorem 12 states that, given an event model (M 0; w0), any initial
situation satisfying the formula (M 0; w0)00 will result in a nal situation where 00 holds
after the occurrence of the event represented by (M 0; w0). This condition (M 0; w0) 00
is not only sucient but also necessary: any initial situation which does not satisfy
the formula (M 0; w0)  00 will not result in a nal situation where 00 holds after the
occurrence of the event represented by (M 0; w0).
Proof. We prove Theorem 12 by induction on 00.
 Case 00 = p:
First, we prove the implication from left to right. Assume thatM;w j= (M 0; w0)
p. Then, by denition, M;w j= Pre(w0) ^ p. Therefore, M;w j= Pre(w0) and
M;w j= p. Hence, by denition of the product update (Equation 4), it also holds
that (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00.
Second, we prove the implication from right to left. Assume that M;w j=
Pre(w0) and (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= p. Then, by denition of the product update,
M;w j= p. Therefore, M;w j= Pre(w0) ^ p, i.e. M;w j= (M 0; w0) p.
 Case 00 = : 00:
First, we prove the implication from left to right. Assume thatM;w j= (M 0; w0)
: 00, i.e. M;w j= Pre(w0)^:((M 0; w0) 00). Then, M;w j= Pre(w0) and M;w 2
(M 0; w0)   00. Therefore, by Induction Hypothesis, M;w 2 Pre(w0) or (M;w) 

(M 0; w0) 2  00. Now, because M;w j= Pre(w0), it holds that (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j=
: 00, i.e. (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= 00. So, nally, M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w) 

(M 0; w0) j= 00.
Second, we prove the implication from right to left. Assume that M;w j=
Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00. Then, (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) 2  00, so by Induc-
20
February 3, 2013 Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics JANCL2012-Camera-Ready
tion Hypothesis, M;w 2 (M 0; w0) 00. Hence, M;w j= Pre(w0)^:(M 0; w0) 00,
i.e.M;w j= (M 0; w0): 00 by the Equations 22. So, nally,M;w j= (M 0; w0)00.
 Case 00 = 001 _ 002:
We only prove the implication from left to right, the other direction being proved
similarly. Assume that M;w j= (M 0; w0)  001 _ 002. Then, by the Equations 22,
M;w j= (M 0; w0)  001 or M;w j= (M 0; w0)  002. So, by Induction Hypothesis,
(M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 001) or (M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)

(M 0; w0) j= 002). Therefore, M;w j= Pre(w0) and ((M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= 001 or
(M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j= 002). So, nally, M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w) 
 (M 0; w0) j=
001 _ 002, i.e. M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00.
 Case 00 = hBji 00:
First, we prove the implication from left to right. Assume that M;w j=
(M 0; w0)  hBji 00. Then, by denition of Equations 22, M;w j= Pre(w0) ^_
v02Rj(w0)
hBji((M 0; v0)  00). Therefore, M;w j= Pre(w0) and there is v0 2 Rj(w0)
such that M;w j= hBji((M 0; v0)   00). Then, by Induction Hypothesis, there is
v 2 Rj(w) such that M;v j= Pre(v0) and (M; v)
 (M 0; v0) j=  00. Hence, there is
(v; v0) 2 Rj(w;w0) such that (M;v)
(M 0; v0) j=  00. Therefore, (M;w)
(M 0; w0) j=
hBji 00.
Second, we prove the implication from right to left. Assume that M;w j=
Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= hBji 00. Then, there is (v; v0) 2 Rj(w;w0) such
that (M;v) 
 (M 0; v0) j=  00. Then, M;v j= Pre(v0) and (M; v) 
 (M 0; v0) j=
 00. Therefore, by Induction Hypothesis, M; v j= (M 0; v0)   00. Now, because
v 2 Rj(w), it holds that M;w j= hBji((M 0; v0)   00). Therefore, M;w j=_
v02Rj(w0)
hBji((M 0; v0) 00). So, nally, M;w j= Pre(w0)^ _
v02Rj(w0)
hBji((M 0; v0)
 00) i.e. M;w j= (M 0; w0) hBji 00. That is M;w j= (M 0; w0) 00.
5.2.2 Regression of 00 by 0
We can generalize the notion of regression of 00 by (M 0; w0) by considering that the
event is incompletely described by a formula 0. This leads us to dene the notion of
regression of 00 by 0.
Denition 20 (Regression of 00 by 0). Let 00 2 L, 0 2 L0, and let n =
max fdeg(00); deg(0)g. Let P 0 be the set of propositional letters appearing in 0. Then,
by Corollary 2, there is a subset S0  SP 0n such that 0 $
_
02S0
0 2 K0. The regression of
00 by 0, which we write 0  00, is dened as follows:
0  00 =_0  00  0 2 S0 (25)
where 0  00 is dened inductively as follows:
0  p = Pre(0) ^ p
0  (00 _  00) = (0  00) _ (0   00)
0  :00 = Pre(0) ^ :(0  00)
0  hBji00 = Pre(0) ^ _
02Rj(0)
hBji(0  00): (26)
The following theorem provides an alternative and non-constructive denition of the
operator 0  00.
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Theorem 13. Let 0 2 L0 and 00 2 L, and let P 0 be a nite subset of 0. Then, for all
L-model (M;w), it holds that
M;w j= 0  00 i there is (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0;
M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00
Note that we could dene a dual operator of 0  00 as follows:
0[]00 = :  0  :00 (27)
Then, the counterpart of Theorem 13 for this dual operator is as follows:
M;w j= 0[]00 i for all (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0;
if M;w j= Pre(w0) then (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00 (28)
This denition entails that, given any initial situation satisfying 0[]00, any event
satisfying 0 occurring in this situation would result in a nal situation where 00 holds
true:
0[]00; 0 00 (29)
To prove Theorem 13, we rely on Lemma 3 below, whose proof is very similar to the
proof of Lemma 1 (so we do not repeat it here). The proof of Theorem 13 then follows
the same lines as the proof of Theorem 8.
Lemma 3. Let 00 2 L, let P 0 be a nite subset of 0, and let n = deg(00). Then,
for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0), for all 0 2 SP 0n such that M 0; w0 j= 0, it holds that
(M 0; w0) 00 $ 0  00 2 K.
5.2.3 Connection between DEL-sequents 0; 00 3  and regression 0  00
Finally, the following central theorem connects DEL-sequents with the notion of re-
gression.
Theorem 14. Let ; 00 2 L and let 0 2 L0. Then,
0; 00 3  i 0  00 !  2 K: (30)
Just as for progression and epistemic planning, this theorem shows that the notion
of regression of 00 by 0 is an analogue in a dynamic setting of the notion of prime
implicate in propositional logic. Indeed, Theorem 14 states that 000 captures all the
information which can be inferred about the initial situation, when everything we know
about the event that just occured is that it satises 0, and everything we know about
the nal situation is that it saties 00. The counterpart of Theorem 14 for the dual
operator 0[]00 states the following:
; 0 00 i ! 0[]00 2 K: (31)
To prove Theorem 14, we will rely on the following lemma whose proof is similar to
the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Let ; 00 2 L, and let 0 2 L0. Then, 0  00 !  2 K if and only if for all
pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0, (M 0; w0)P 0 00 !  2 K.
We can now prove Theorem 14:
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Figure 2. Players A and B show their cards to each other in front of player C
Proof. It holds that 0; 00 3 
i for all pointed L-model (M;w) and L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M;w j= Pre(w0), if
M 0; w0 j= 0 and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00, then M;w j= ,
i for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0, for all pointed L-model
(M;w), if M;w j= Pre(w0) and (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00, then M;w j= ,
i for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0, for all pointed L-model
(M;w), if M;w j= (M 0; w0) 00, then M;w j= , by Theorem 12
i for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0, for all pointed L-model
(M;w), it holds that M;w j= (M 0; w0) 00 ! ,
i for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such thatM 0; w0 j= 0, it holds that (M 0; w0)00 !
 2 K,
i 0  00 !  2 K by Lemma 4.
Finally, note that Theorems 12, 13 and 14 can easily be generalized similarly to other
logics than K and K0 in case the class of frames these logics dene is stable for the
product update.
5.3 Example
Let us resume our Card Example and assume that players A and B show their card to
each other. As it turns out, C noticed that A showed her card to B but did not notice
that B did so to A. Players A and B know this. This event is represented by the L0-model
(M 0; w0) of Figure 2. The boxed possible event w0 corresponds to the actual event. The
atomic event p0 stands for `player A shows her red card', q0 stands for the atomic event
`player A shows her white card' and r0 stands for the atomic event `players A and B show
their red and white cards respectively to each other'. The precondition Pre(p0) of p0 is
rA, the precondition Pre(q
0) of q0 is wA, and the precondition Pre(r0) of r0 is rA^wB. As
a result of this event, the agents update their beliefs. In the resulting model, the following
holds for example: (M;w)
(M 0; w0) j= BB(rA^wB^bC). It states that player A `knows'
the true state of the world. Therefore, it holds thatM;w j= (M 0; w0)BB(rA^wB^bC):
But this resulting knowledge of agent B might be due to the specic intial epistemic
state of agent B. So, our problem is the following:
What sucient and necessary property (i.e. `minimal' property) an initial situation
should fulll so that the occurrence of the event represented by (M 0; w0) results in
a situation where agent B knows the true state of the world, i.e. agent B knows
that agent A has the red card and that agent C has the blue card?
Answering this question boils down to compute the formula (M 0; w0)BB(rA^wB^bC):
(M 0; w0)BB(rA ^ wB ^ bC)
= (M 0; w0) :hBBi(:rA _ :wB _ :bC)
= Pre(w0) ^ :(M 0; w0) hBBi(:rA _ :wB _ :bC)
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= rA ^ wB ^ :hBBi(M 0; w0) (:rA _ :wB _ :bC)
= rA ^ wB ^ :hBBi ((M 0; w0) :rA _ (M 0; w0) :wB _ (M 0; w0) :bC)
= rA ^wB ^:hBBi(((rA ^wB)^:(M 0; w0) rA)_ ((rA ^wB)^:(M 0; w0)wB)_
((rA ^ wB) ^ :(M 0; w0) bC))
= rA ^ wB ^ :hBBi ((rA ^ wB ^ :rA) _ (rA ^ wB ^ bC) _ (rA ^ wB ^ :bC))
Now, rA^wB^:hBBi ((rA ^ wB ^ :rA) _ (rA ^ wB ^ bC) _ (rA ^ wB ^ :bC))$ rA^
wB ^BB(:(rA ^ wB) _ bC) 2 K. So, nally,
(M 0; w0)BB(rA ^ wB ^ bC)$ (rA ^ wB) ^BB(rA ^ wB ! bC) 2 K
This formula states that the necessary and sucient condition that an initial situation
should fulll so that the occurrence of the event represented by (M 0; w0) in this situation
results in a nal situation where agent B `knows' the true state of the world is that agent
A does have the red card, agent B does have the white card and that agent B believes
that, under these assumptions, agent C has the blue card.
6. Generalizing BMS
In this section, we show how the BMS language introduced by Baltag,Moss and Solecki
in (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Batlag et al., 1998) can be generalized to account for
incomplete descriptions of events.
6.1 The BMS language
The standard BMS language is dened by resorting to the notion of action signature,
which is closely related to the notion of L0-model. An action signature is a tuple  =
(W 0; R0; (w01; : : : ; w0n)) where: 1)W 0 is a non-empty and nite set of action types (possible
events are called \action types" in the BMS formalism), 2) R0 : Agt ! 2W 0W 0 is
a function assigning to each agent j 2 Agt an accessibility relation on W 0, and 3)
fw01; : : : ; w0ng is a subset of W 0 such that for all i; j 2 f1; : : : ; ng, if i 6= j then w0i 6= w0j .
If we consider an action signature  = (W 0; R0; (w01; : : : ; w0n)) together with a set of
formulas 1; : : : ; n 2 L, then we can get back an L0-model. The L0-model associated
to (; 1; : : : ; n) is the tuple M
0 = (W 0; R0; V 0) where the valuation V 0 is dened as
follows. We pick q0 2 0 such that Pre(q0) = >, and for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, we pick p0i 2 0
such that Pre(p0i) = i. Then, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng we set V 0(p0i) = fw0ig, we also set
V 0(q0) =W 0 fw01; : : : ; w0ng, and for all p0 2 0 fq0; p01; : : : ; p0ng we set V 0(p0) = ;. Note
that a L0-model associated to (; 1; : : : ; n) is a complete L0-model.
Denition 21 (BMS Language). Let  = (W 0; R0; (w01; : : : ; w0n)) be an action signature.
The BMS language L is dened inductively as follows.
L :  ::= p j : j  ^  j Bj j [; w0; 1; : : : ; n]
where p ranges over  and 1; : : : ; n range over L.
Let (M;w) be a pointed L-model. The truth conditions for the language L are dened
as in Denition 2, except for the operator [; w0; 1; : : : ; n]:
M;w j= [; w0; 1; : : : ; n] i M;w j= Pre(w0) implies (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 
where (M 0; w0) is the L0-model associated to  and 1; : : : ; n.
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The intuitive reading of the modality [; w0; 1; : : : ; n] is \ holds after the oc-
currence of an event, whose perception by the agents is completely represented by the
L0-model associated to  and 1; : : : ; n".
6.2 A generalization of the BMS language
With the BMS language L that we just spelled out, one can reason about the eects
of events only when these events are fully specied and described by means of event
models. This is obviously a limitation since agents are often confronted to situations
where they only have a partial perception of the events happening: some agents may
simply be out of their sight for instance. Therefore, we introduce the dynamic modality
[0], whose intuitive reading is \ holds after the occurrence of any event satisfying
0", or in other words \ holds after the occurence of an event such that what we only
know about this event is that it satises 0". The formula 0 typically describes partially
and incompletely the event occurring, although it could provide a full description of it
as well.
Denition 22 (Language LF ). The language LF is dened inductively as follows:
LF :  ::= p j : j  ^  j Bj j

0


where p ranges over , 0 ranges over L0 and j over Agt. The formula h0i is an
abbreviation of the formula : [0]:.
Let (M;w) be a pointed L-model. The truth conditions for the language LF are
dened as in Denition 2, except for the operator [0]:
M;w j= 0 i for all pointed L0-model (M 0; w0) such that M 0; w0 j= 0;
if M;w j= Pre(w0) then (M;w)
 (M 0; w0) j= 00
Note that the denition of [0] is identical to the denition of 0[] in Equation
28.
To show that the BMS language can be embedded in the language LF , we dene the
translation t : L ! LF inductively as follows:
t(p) = p
t(:) = :t()
t( ^  ) = t() ^ t( )
t(Bj) = Bjt()
t([; w0; 1; : : : ; n]) = [k(M 0; w0)]t()
where k = deg() and (M 0; w0) is the pointed (and complete) L0-model associated to
(; w0; 1; : : : ; n).
Theorem 15. Let (M;w) be a pointed epistemic model and let  2 L. It holds that
M;w j=  if and only if M;w j= t().
Proof. The proof is by induction on the formula . The only non trivial case is when 
is of the form Bj . This case is proved by the fact that for all k 2 N, for all pointed,
complete and nite L0-model (M 0; w0), the formula k(M 0; w0) 2 L0 is such that 1)
M 0; w0 j= k(M 0; w0), 2) for all pointed L0-model (M 00; w00), if M 00; w00 j= n(M 0; w0)
then (M 0; w0) and (M 00; w00) are k-bisimilar (see (Blackburn et al., 2001, p. 74) for the
denition of k-bisimilarity).
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Finally, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the language LF :
Theorem 16. The logic LF dened below is a sound and complete axiomatization of
LF with respect to the class of L-models. Below, the formula 0 stands for any Kit Fine
formula for K0.
Basic axioms and rules
(Epistemic) All axiom schemes and inference rules of K
([0]-distribution) ` [0] (!  )! ([0]! [0] )
([0]-necessitation) If `  then ` [0]
Event axioms
(Event Consistency) ` [?]
(Atomic Permanence) ` [0] p$ (Pre(0)! p)
(Partial Functionality) ` [0]:$ (Pre(0)! : [0])
if deg(0)  deg()
(Action Knowledge) ` [0]Bj$
0@Pre(0)! ^
02Rj(0)
Bj [
0]
1A
if deg(0) > deg()
(Decomposition) ` h0 _  0i$ h0i _ h 0i
Bridge Rule
(Transfer) If `0 0 !  0 then ` h0i! h 0i
Proof. The proof of soundness is routine. We only prove the completeness of LF. Because
of Corollary 2, the Transfer rule and the Decomposition axiom, any formula of LF is
provably equivalent to a formula where all the subformulas with dynamic operators are
of the form [?] or [0], where deg(0)  deg(). Now, because of the reduction axioms
Event Consistency, Atomic Permanence, Partial Functionality and Action Knowledge,
one can prove by induction on these subformulas with dynamic operators that they are
themselves provably equivalent to epistemic formulae of L. Then, using [0]-distribution
and [0]-necessitation, one proves in general that any formula of LF is provably equiv-
alent to a formula of L. That is, for all  2 LF , there is  2 L such that  $  2 LF
and therefore also j=  $  , by soundness. Then, if j= , then j=  , so  2 K by
completeness of K. Hence, because K  LF,  2 LF. So, nally, because  $  2 LF, it
holds that  2 LF. So, we have proved completeness.
Note that the reduction axioms Atomic Permanence, Partial Functionality and Action
Knowledge are the dual of the axioms spelled out in Equation 26 which are themselves
an extrapolation of the standard reduction axioms of DEL spelled out in Equation 23.
Below are two key theorems of the logic LF:
Bj

0

$ Bj0Bj 2 LF (Reduction Axiom)
The above theorem of LF states that agent j believes now that  will hold after the
occurrence of any event satisfying 0 i she will believe that  holds after the occurrence
of any event during which she believes that 0 holds.
for all i 6= j, 0 ^Bi 0Bj$ 0Bj 2 LF (Independence of Agents)
The above theorem of LF states that the beliefs of other agents about the event
occurring do not aect our own beliefs about the resulting situation. Finally, we have
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the following fact which connects our generalized language LF with DEL-sequents:
; 0 00 i ! 000 2 LF (32)
Note that Equation 32 is a rewritting of Equation 31.
7. Conclusion
7.1 Related work
In dynamic epistemic logic, regression and epistemic planning issues have drawn uneven
attention.
7.1.1 Regression
The regression technique is used very often in the DEL literature. It corresponds to
the classical reduction method employed to prove completeness of an axiomatization: a
formula with dynamic operator(s) is `reduced' equivalently to a formula without dynamic
operator by pushing the dynamic operator through the logical connectives, performing
some kind of regression of the initial formula with dynamic operator.
7.1.2 Epistemic planning
Few works address the problem of epistemic planning in DEL. The only works in that
direction that we are aware of are rather recent and were developped independently
from our work.
In (van der Hoek & Wooldridge, 2002), van der Hoek and Wooldridge transpose the
epistemic planning problem into a problem of model checking in Alternating Temporal
Epistemic Logic (ATEL). However, they assume that their semantic structures used
to represent the planning domain (called Alternating Epistemic Transition System) is
already given and nite.
In ( Agotnes & van Ditmarsch, 2011), Agotnes and van Ditmarsch study what they call
\public announcement games", which are games whose actions are simultaneous public
announcements by each agent of formulas known by them and whose payo depends
on whether or not a goal epistemic formula is satised after the simultaneous public
anouncements for each agent. The authors state properties satised by these games and
connect them with Bayesian games.
In (Lowe, Pacuit, & Witzel, 2011), Lowe, Pacuit and Witzel present what they call
the \(absolute) DEL planning problem": given a pointed L-model, a formula  2 L and
a nite set of L0-models, produce a (legal) sequence  of these L0-models such that the
occurrence of this sequence of events in the initial L-model results in a situation where 
holds. They show that under very specic conditions (the preconditions of event models
are propositional and event models are \almost mutually exclusive"), the DEL planning
problem is decidable.
In (Bolander & Andersen, 2011), Bolander and Andersen prove that the \DEL plan-
ning problem" is decidable in case there is a single agent and undecidable in case we deal
with ontic events and there are at least three agents (even without the common knowl-
edge modality). They also show that their planning domain generalize some well-known
types of planning domains studied in automated planning (Cimatti, Pistore, & Traverso,
2008; Ghallab, Nau, & Traverso, 2004). The DEL-planning problem is very close to
our epistemic planning problem. An important dierence is that we do not deal with a
given set of L0-models, we instead deal with a given set of atomic events 0, and that we
do not consider sequence of events. This enables us to dene decidable procedures which
provide the sucient and necessary condition, under the form of a formula 0 2 L0, so
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that the occurrence of an event in the initial situation yields a nal situation where 
holds. One should also note that the undecidability result of (Bolander & Andersen,
2011) is proved only for ontic events and assuming that there are at least three agents.
7.2 Concluding remarks
If we want our formalisms to be applied, our results should be recast into decision
procedures leading to implemented reasoning tools. To this aim, we have developped
in (Aucher et al., 2011, 2012) a tableau method for our DEL-sequents which has been
implemented in LOTRECscheme. Even if this work provides algorithmic methods which
address part (a) of the three questions of the introduction, we still need to provide
algorithmic methods which address part (b) of these three questions. As pointed out
after Denition 15, our recursive denitions of 
 0, P 0 00 and 0  00 can be seen
as algorithmic denitions. Spelling out these algorithms and determining their exact
running time complexity is a theoretical prerequisite to determine whether or not our
methods are indeed applicable and how they can be applied.
We followed in this paper and its companion paper (Aucher, 2011) the external
approach, representing our situations involving several agents from an external and
omniscient point of view. However, it would be more appropriate if we want our for-
malisms to be implemented and used by articial agents to follow the internal approach
(Aucher, 2010) and represent situations from the point of view of the articial agent
itself, as in (Bolander & Andersen, 2011). Adopting this internal approach might yield
quite dierent denitions and axiomatizations.
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